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The competing neuro-behavioral decision systems (CNDS) model proposes that the
degree to which an individual discounts the future is a function of the relative
hyperactivity of an impulsive system based on the limbic and paralimbic brain regions
and the relative hypoactivity of an executive system based in prefrontal cortex (PFC).
The model depicts the relationship between these categorial systems in terms of
the antipodal neurophysiological, behavioral, and decision (cognitive) functions that
engender normal and addictive responding. However, a case may be made for
construing several components of the impulsive and executive systems depicted in
the model as categories (elements) of additional systems that are concerned with
the metacognitive control of behavior. Hence, this paper proposes a category-based
structure for understanding the effects on behavior of CNDS, which includes not only
the impulsive and executive systems of the basic model but a superordinate level of
reflective or rational decision-making. Following recent developments in the modeling
of cognitive control which contrasts Type 1 (rapid, autonomous, parallel) processing
with Type 2 (slower, computationally demanding, sequential) processing, the proposed
model incorporates an arena in which the potentially conflicting imperatives of impulsive
and executive systems are examined and from which a more appropriate behavioral
response than impulsive choice emerges. This configuration suggests a forum in which
the interaction of picoeconomic interests, which provide a cognitive dimension for
CNDS, can be conceptualized. This proposition is examined in light of the resolution
of conflict by means of bundling.
Keywords: competing neuro-behavioral decision systems, CNDS model, dual- and triple-process models,
metacognitive control, temporal discounting, picoeconomics, bundling, categorical system
INTRODUCTION
“. . .akrasia in rational beings is as common as wine in France”
(Searle, 2001, p. 10)
As I scan my daily newspaper over breakfast, I note the television programs scheduled for the
evening. It is easy at so early an hour to vow that I will under no circumstances allow myself to
watch what is on offer. Tidying my sock drawer or deadheading the roses seems a more valuable
use of my time, and serious reading or writing infinitely preferable. Comes the evening, however,
the opportunity to relax and be passively entertained wins out. Am I speaking here of “myself ”
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as one person whose preferences are reversible simply with the
passage of time, or of two separate categories of agents warring to
get the upper hand? If the latter, how are these categories related
and how do they influence each another? Perhaps there is some
superordinate level of decision-making that arbitrates between
them; or perhaps they reflect no more than differing histories of
operant reinforcement.
The problem of preferences that change with time lies at
the heart of many comparatively trivial daily decisions. What
seems perfectly reasonable when we begin becomes absurd
simply because other options, ultimately less valuable than the
initial longer-term objective, have become immediately accessible
(Rachlin, 2000a). Apparently for that reason alone, these choices
that may be categorically classified as temporarily short-term
assume an irresistible level of attractiveness: the result may
be excessive consumption leading to obesity or procrastination
leading to failure to achieve (Ainslie, 2010). The problem,
akrasia or weakness of will, occurs also in the more serious
contexts of substance abuse and problem gambling, even when
the individuals concerned know from experience the deleterious
outcomes of their behavior and have the “best intentions” of
changing it. Once again, the questions of the apparently “divided
self ” or “multiple selves” arise (Elster, 1987; Ainslie, 2001; Ross
et al., 2008). It is interesting that Searle (2001) speaks of akrasia
as a common characteristic of rational beings: in what sense are
we to understand the rationality that underlies such self-defeating
behavior?
The initially self-controlled and subsequently impulsive
behaviors involved in preference reversal can be traced to
neurophysiological and cognitive bases of competing decision
systems. Jentsch and Taylor (1999) propose that drug seeking
stems from amygdala-based reward processing that intensifies the
incentive value of potentially addictive substances, accompanied
by the weakened capacity of frontal cortical processes to
impede such behavior. Bechara (2005) similarly argues that the
extent of an individual’s willpower to resist drugs depends on
the relationship between an impulsive system based on the
amygdala which indicates the immediate outcomes of behavior
and a reflective system, based on ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC) which indicates delayed outcomes (Bickel and
Yi, 2010). This relationship has been most comprehensively
described, however, in the competing neuro-behavioral decision
systems (CNDS) model which hypothesizes that two competing
neural systems, respectively, exert excitatory or inhibitory
control over potentially addictive behavior (Bickel et al.,
2013).
The CNDS model proposes that imbalance between an
individual’s “impulsive” and “executive” categorical systems
BOX 1 | Temporal discounting and preference reversal.
A reward that is to be received at some time in the future – say, $100 in a year’s rime – does not seem right now to be worth waiting that long for
unless there is some extra bonus attached to it. If someone owes me this amount and offers to let me have in 12 months, I am inclined to say that I will require,
say, $110 at that time. Reward for which one has to wait are devalued or discounted. We say that temporal discounting is concerned with the current subjective
value of a reward that will be received in the future, i.e., the value of that future reward rated in the present moment. Financial professionals discount exponentially,
i.e., at a constant rate regardless of the time elapsed. Their behavior can be expressed as Vi = Aie−kDi where Vi is the present value of a delayed reward, Ai the
amount of delayed reward, k a constant proportional to the degree of temporal discounting, Di the delay of the reward, and e the base of natural logarithms. Because
this behavior is based on a constant rate of discounting, a larger, later reward (the LLR, available at t2) always has a value greater than that of a smaller reward
available sooner (the SSR, available at t1). This is shown in the first segment (A) of the figure, where the two lines, representing the relative values of the reward, never
cross.
Often, however, human behavior is marked by a style of discounting in which the value of a reward changes radically as the time remaining before it becomes
available is reduced. While the LLR is preferred at t0, indicated by the initially higher line in segment (B) of the figure, just prior to t1, when the SSR will becomes
available, its value markedly increases, the curves cross, and the individual opts for the poorer reward. This form of temporal discounting and the preference
reversal it involves is described by a hyperbolic function: Vd = A/(1 + kD) in which Vd is the discounted value of a reward of a particular magnitude or amount,
A, received after a delay, D (Mazur, 1987; Madden and Bickel, 2010). Rate of discounting varies with the amount of delay (Ainslie, 1992, 2001; Rachlin, 2000a;
Rick and Loewenstein, 2008).
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influences his/her rate of temporal discounting (see Box 1).1
Hyperactivity of the impulsive system, based on limbic and
paralimbic brain regions, coupled with hypoactivity of the
executive system, based in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), results
in a tendency to discount the future steeply and to engage in
addictive behavior (Bickel and Yi, 2008). A major premise of
the CNDS model is, therefore, that the impulsive and executive
systems must be in some respects antipodal categories and yet
contribute in a complementary manner to the determination of
the individual’s temporal discounting behavior and valuation of
currently and potentially available reinforcers. These have been
concerns of the CNDS model’s authors who also emphasize
the role of metacognition (i.e., “cognition about cognition”
or “thought about thought”) in the regulation of inter-system
connectivity (Jarmolowicz et al., 2013). In attempting to clarify
further the factors responsible for the achievement of relative
balance between the impulsive and executive systems, this paper
explores further the antipodality of the model’s categorical
component decision systems and, in particular, the nature and
role of metacognition in their relationships.
The CNDS model has two important implications for
the resolution of the question of multiple selves. First, by
incorporating cognitive or decision-making contributors to the
extent of an individual’s temporal discounting tendency, it
links to the capacity to regulate behavior through goal setting
and maintenance, social cognition (understanding why others
behave as they do), and insight (taking one’s own imperfections
into account in judging behavioral outcomes). Second, the
model’s incorporation of operant behavioral economics and
neuroeconomics (Bickel et al., 2007, 2011, 2012a) facilitates its
integration with the economic reasoning which underlies another
significant contribution to the explanation of multiple selves
and their interaction, namely picoeconomics (Ainslie, 1992, 2001;
Ross, 2012; Foxall, 2014a,b).
Ainslie (1992) speaks of the problem of akrasia by reference
to separate interests that are in conflict: one concerned with
our gaining long term benefit such as engaging in productive
work, the other with short-term pleasures like undemanding
amusement. One’s experience as the locus of this clash of interests
is often marked by a sturdy resolve to undertake the more
rewarding activity, followed by a lapse into the other just as
it becomes available, followed by regret, further resolution and
perhaps inevitable relapse. This cycle is characteristic of addiction
but it also marks many everyday switches of preference involved
in less extreme behavior. What is so preferable when we make our
plans is edged out by an alternative that is initially unthinkable
but of immense value as it arrives in sight. Even though we know
full well that the activity which we were determined to undertake
when we set out will bring greater benefit, the fact that it is
delayed while the less beneficial can be obtained immediately
raises the value of the latter sharply till it exceeds the current
1Behavior analysts have conducted a large volume of research on temporal
discounting and the matching phenomena which underlie it (Ferster and Skinner,
1957; Herrnstein, 1997). For reviews of this research, see Madden and Bickel
(2010), Dallery and Soto (2012), Grace and Hucks (2012), Hursh et al. (2012),
Jacobs et al. (2012), Foxall (2016). See also Foxall (2015) and the special issue on
Operant Behavioral Economics this introduces.
worth of the other (see Box 1). An intriguing facet of Ainslie’s
approach is the possibility that, by “bundling” together (Figure 1)
the combined benefits of a series of later-appearing reward and
comparing these in toto with the immediate benefit of a current
less valuable choice, it is possible to overcome the temptation
to make a sub-optimal decision (i.e., to exercise “willpower” or
“self-control”). Hence, picoeconomics has implications for the
role of cognition and metacognition in relationships between
neuro-behavioral decision systems and the place of agency in
understanding their interaction.
Some of these implications are taken up by Ross (2009)
who defines the situation in economic terms by reference to
two reward available at different times such that a is, for
example, taking a short vacation starting in a week [t1], and
b is, for instance, starting a 2-years course of study for a
higher degree, [t2]. Looking well into the future, the person’s
utility function indicates that b is preferable to a. At this
point, the person discounts the future rather gently. However,
as the time for the vacation to occur becomes closer, the
person’s utility function indicates a preference for a over b. Ross
(2012) models the various picoeconomic interests in two ways
depending on whether these interests are conceived as acting
synchronously or diachronically. In the first case, they may be
seen as subagents that have either conflicting utility functions
or divergent time preferences. Agents with conflicting utility
functions may be modeled in terms of a Nash equilibrium game
among these agents. Modeling the behavior of subagents whose
time preferences diverge adverts to the sub-personal level of
neurophysiology in which a hyperbolic time preference emerges
from “competition between steeply exponentially discounting
FIGURE 1 | The Principle of Bundling. The solid lines represent any of the
individual members of the stream of paired SSR/LLR choices that will be
available to the individual over time. (Hence, tx is the time of any occurrence of
an SSR which is paired with an LLR that occurs at tx+1, and we are assuming
a sequence of such SSR/LLR pairings over time). The dashed lines represent
the individual’s imagined aggregation of these reward if they were all brought
forward to a point just prior to the appearance of the first SSR. In this case,
LLR will always exceed SSR and a decision to select it exclusively on
subsequent occasions can be more easily made.
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‘limbic’ regions and more patient (less steeply exponentially
discounting) ‘cognitive’ regions” (Ross, 2012, p. 720). Like the
CNDS model, this picoeconomic portrayal depends heavily on
the findings a key experiment in neuroeconomics based on fMRI
scans of humans choosing between SSR and LLR (McClure
et al., 2004). In the process of scrutinizing immediate reward,
participants activated brain regions that involve emotion, namely
medial orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex/pregenual
cingulate cortex, and ventral striatum. However, while examining
longer-term payoffs, they activated areas of the lateral PFC
(implicated in higher cognitive functioning), and part of the
parietal cortex related to quantitative reasoning. In his modeling
of picoeconomic conflict in terms of diachronically appearing
multiple selves, Ross (2012) speculates briefly about the cognitive
demands of such a portrayal: each subagent is portrayed as
temporarily in control of the person’s behavior, with its own
utility function and incomplete knowledge of the other, though
its utility is constrained by the investments made by earlier-
appearing agent(s).
In seeking to clarify the issue of multiple selves, this paper
draws on recent investigations of antipodality between the
categorial components of the impulsive and executive systems
(Bickel et al., 2012b). This work is invaluable for identifying
the elements of a theory of behavior that would account for
both normal and excessive (addictive) consumption of substances
such as alcohol and other drugs and activities such as gambling.
Importantly, it demonstrates which elements of the impulsive
system are antipodal to elements of the executive system (and can,
therefore, be properly considered categorial components of these
antithetical tendencies), as well as those which play a broader
role in the execution of appropriate behaviors. Prominent among
the latter are what the CNDS model identifies as metacognition
and the goal-directed regulation of behavior (Jarmolowicz et al.,
2013).
The paper builds on the results of this work to propose a model
of cognitive functioning in addiction that places the impulsive
and executive systems in a framework consistent with recent
developments in multi-process theories of cognition (Stanovich
and West, 2000; Stanovich, 2009, 2011). It thereby incorporates a
broader domain of theory on the cognitive control of behavior
which acknowledges a long-standing division of thinking into
that which is rapid and intuitive as opposed to that which is slow
and deliberative (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). This dichotomy
of categories is similar to that which marks the distinction
between impulsive and executive systems and is consistent with
the account of behavioral control that the examination of the
CNDS model in terms of antipodality reveals. The advantage
of such a framework is that it allows for a forum within which
the competing demands of the impulsive and executive systems
interact so that conflict is resolved and behavior that generates
more acceptable long-term consequences is selected over short-
term expediency.
The central focus is, therefore, on the structure of the CNDS
model and, in particular, its incorporation of metacognitive
control of behavior. In the next sections, the CNDS model is
described in greater detail and the implications of antipodality
for the construal of decision systems is discussed. The questions
of how metacognition is depicted in the model and a potential
tripartite model are the foci of the following sections. Finally, the
implications of the analysis for understanding the multiplicity of
selves involved in the decision process are discussed by critically
examining the emergent framework in terms of picoeconomic
bundling behavior.
THE COMPETING NEURO-BEHAVIORAL
DECISION SYSTEMS MODEL
The Neurophysiological Dimension
At the neurophysiological level, the CNDS hypothesis (Bickel
et al., 2012a, 2013) assumes that normal and addictive behaviors
reflect the balance between the relative hyperactivity of the
limbic and paralimbic systems that are differentially implicated in
emotional responding and the relative hypoactivity of prefrontal
cortical areas that are differentially implicated in judgment,
planning, and other cognitive activities. Hence, the degree of
addictiveness exhibited in behavior reflects the balance of activity
in brain regions, the first of which, the impulsive system, based
on the amygdala and ventral striatum, involves the distribution
of dopamine during reinforcement learning, while the second,
the executive system, residing in the PFC, is implicated in the
evaluation of reward and their outcomes. The competing systems
that comprise the model are more broadly based than these
neurophysiological regions, embracing in addition behavioral
and cognitive components which justifies their being called
neuro-behavioral decision systems. (Bechara, 2005, nominates
these the impulsive system and the reflective system, respectively;
see also Verdejo-Garcia and Bechara, 2009).
The Impulsive System
The impulsive system incorporates the amygdala and ventral
striatum, a midbrain region concerned with the valence of
immediate results of action, and is liable to become hyperactive
as a result of “exaggerated processing of the incentive value of
substance-related cues” (Bechara, 2005, p. 1459). Drug-induced
behaviors correlate with enhanced response in this region when
the amygdala displays increased sensitization to reward (London
et al., 2000; Bickel and Yi, 2008). The receipt of positive
reinforcers of all varieties causes the release of dopamine in the
nucleus accumbens. This is true of both utilitarian reinforcers
such as drugs of abuse, and the receipt of informational
reinforcers such as social reward or self-esteem (Foxall, 2011). It is
also the case for of the receipt of money which has both utilitarian
and informational aspects. In the case of a drug of abuse, such
brain reward is acute. The effect of the drug in inculcating LTP
at specific synapses is recorded in the hippocampus as the result
of experience (memory).1 In the amygdala is involved in the
1Recent research indicates a far more complicated picture than this. LTP is
currently understood as no more than a possible molecular mechanism of learning
(see, for instance, Migaud et al., 1998; Uetani et al., 2000). The role of LTD, which
has been correlated with learning, is of particular importance. Present knowledge
on synaptic plasticity and learning performance, incorporating the learning of
drugs’ capacity to reward, indicates that LTP and LTD tend toward an optimal
balance which may influences memory performance. Memory formation may also
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creation of a learned (conditioned) response to the stimuli that
accompany the use of the drug. These accompanying stimuli
might take the form of informational (social) reinforcers and
discriminative stimuli. (For discussion of these points, see, inter
alia, McGaugh, 2004; Phelps, 2006; Gruber and McDonald, 2012.)
The resulting focus of research has been on the mesolimbic
dopaminergic system and other brain regions such as the
amygdala and ventral striatum involved in emotional responses.
But there is recent evidence that the insula is important because
of its relation to conscious craving for drugs (Naqvi and Bechara,
2008). This role has been revealed by correlation-based fMRI
studies which show the increased activity of the insula during
self-reported urges to ingest drugs. Such activity is related to
the emergence of the secondary reinforcers which tie drug
use to specific behavioral and contextual factors and to the
cognitive drivers of drug use. “Over time, as addiction increases,
stimuli within the environment that are associated with drug
use become powerful incentives, initiating both automatic (i.e.,
implicit) motivational processes that drive ongoing drug use and
relapse in addiction to conscious (i.e., explicit) feelings of urge
to take drugs” (Naqvi and Bechara, 2008, p. 61; see also Naqvi
et al., 2006). The ritualistic practices involved in the preparation
of drugs, associated with specific places, apparatus, packages,
lighters, and so on, thus become sources of the pleasure that
reinforces not only those activities but the consummatory acts of
drug ingestion. These processes, which elicit specific memories of
encounters with the contexts and the drugs, are also responsible
for differences in the subjective experience of urges for various
drugs be they cigarettes, cocaine or gambling. By ensuring that
the individual keeps particular goals “in mind,” the insula is
also involved in (thwarting) the executive functions that might
overcome drug urges (cf. Tiffany, 1999). The learning process
includes the development of neural plasticity through DA-
priming with respect to the impending chain of appetitive events;
Naqvi and Bechara (2008) propose that this DA-dependency
invokes activity in the insula and associated regions such as the
VMPFC and amygdala. The plasticity involves the establishment
of representations of the interoceptive outcomes of using drugs
and thus engender relapse even after long periods of non-use.
The Executive System
The executive system, which includes the PFC is normally
associated with the executive functions of planning and foresight
(Barkley, 1997, 2012), and is hypothesized to become hypoactive
in the event of addiction. In the absence of its moderating
function, effects of the hyperactive dopaminergic reward pathway
are exacerbated, leading to an imbalance which is implicated
in the enactment of dysfunctional behavior. The behavioral
concomitant of these neurophysiological processes is observable
in the rate at which individuals discount the value of future
reward in favor of more-immediately appearing reinforcers
(Bickel and Yi, 2008). In the context of addiction, the CNDS
hypothesis posits that drug seeking results from “amplified
be subserved by hippocampal network oscillations in the theta, gamma and high-
frequency range and the activity of place-, grid-, time-, and reward-related cells in
the brain (Pan et al., 2005; Eichenbaum, 2014; Moser et al., 2015; Sanders et al.,
2015).
incentive value bestowed on drugs and drug-related cues (via
reward processing by the amygdala) and impaired ability to
inhibit behavior (due to frontal cortical dysfunction)” (Bickel and
Yi, 2010, p. 2).
Analysis of the neurobiological pathway proposed to account
for the acquisition by the PFC of the capacity to control the
higher-level cognitive functions involved in the regulation of
behavior in the face of environmental programming reveals a
two-stage process (Miller and Wallis, 2009). The first stage is the
impingement of signals generated via reinforcement learning on
the PFC circuitry: reinforced operant behavior is accompanied
by the production of signals that associate PFC functioning
with aspects of the stimulus field (the setting in which the
behavior takes place), the nature of the behavioral response
enacted, and the reinforcing and punishing consequences that
are its outcomes. Repeated responding in these circumstances
is capable of generating strong PFC representations of the
contingencies of reinforcement that maintain such behavior.
The second stage in the argument is to account for these
signals and the actions of dopaminergic neurons of the
midbrain. In the course of learning through the repeated
performance of behavioral responses, reinforcers initially activate
the dopaminergic neurons themselves, but subsequently the
stimuli that predict the reinforcers, rather than the reinforcers
themselves, come to activate the dopaminergic neurons. Should
an expected reward not appear, the rate of firing of the
dopaminergic neurons is reduced. The discrepancy between
the expectation of reinforcement and its non-appearance,
coded by the dopaminergic neurons’ activity is known as the
reward prediction error and is instrumental in the organism’s
subsequent ability to direct its actions more effectively toward the
achievement of reinforcement (Miller and Wallis, 2009, p. 103–
104; see also Foxall, 2014b).
The fundamental assumptions that reinforcement is coded by
dopaminergic neurons (Schultz, 1992; Robbins and Everitt, 2002)
and that RPEs are also reflected in the firing rates of dopaminergic
neurons (Schultz et al., 1997) ground the relationship between
neoclassical micro-economics and neuroscience on which
neuroeconomics rests (Glimcher, 2011). For present purposes,
they serve to integrate operant psychology with these disciplines
by promoting a causal connection among reinforcement,
neuronal activity, and behavior (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000;
Schultz, 2010).
The Behavioral Dimension
The operations of these systems combine to generate behavior
that reflects the individual’s valuation of future events, his/her
degree of “temporal discounting.” Hyperbolic temporal
discounting is the procedure in which the later-occurring of two
reward is diminished in an individual’s subjective estimation even
though it is the larger, with the result that the more immediate
reward is selected in preference despite its being by definition the
smaller of the two. This “impulsive” behavior is described by the
hyperbolic discounting function
Vd = A/1 + kD (1)
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where Vd is the discounted value of a reward of a particular
magnitude or amount, A, received after a delay, D (Mazur,
1987; Madden and Bickel, 2010). The k parameter indicates
the extent to which the value of the LLR diminishes compared
to that of the SSR over time (Stein and Madden, 2013). The
major behavioral characteristic of choice described hyperbolically
is that the individual is likely to reverse preferences as time
advances, an observation which is highly relevant to the extreme
drug-use and gambling already mentioned, the making of
resolutions to change, and the yielding to temptation that
may follow. Behavior that discounts the future is of central
importance to the CNDS model insofar as temporal discounting
is an index of the extent to which behavior is under the
control of the tendency toward disinhibited impulsivity (the
selection of an SSR rather than an LLR) as opposed to the
inhibiting influence of the executive functions which results
in the choice of LLR over SSR (“self-controlled” behavior)
(Bickel and Marsch, 2000; Bickel and Yi, 2008; Barkley,
2012).
It is reasonable to inquire how the valuation an individual
attaches to the outcomes of his/her future behavior should be
understood. The CNDS model argues that the neurophysiological
tendencies of the impulsive and executive systems eventuate in
an individual’s degree of temporal discounting behavior which is
explicable in operant terms that translate readily into economic
considerations (Bickel et al., 2007, 2011). Bickel et al. (2012a)
argue that addiction can be conceptualized as an outcome
of “reinforcer pathologies” that can be analyzed in terms of
behavioral economics, specifically the inelasticity of demand
(manifesting in a willingness to pay an extraordinarily high
price for a drug reward) and extremely steep discounting of the
future (manifesting as over-valuation of an immediately available
reward). These elements which reveal an excessive valuation
of one reinforcer in comparison with other available reward
and impulsivity, respectively, are consistent with the pattern of
behavior found in addicts who may accordingly be defined as
“people for whom the transient benefits of the addictive behavior
persistently outweigh the significant short- and long-term costs
of these choices” (Bickel et al., 2012a, p. 334–335). The portrayal
of these benefits in terms of positively- and negatively reinforced
behaviors is confirmed by the neurophysiological analysis of
addiction which depicts addicts’ initial drug administration
as determined by the pleasures this confers and their later
drug use as a means of avoiding or escaping from deleterious
consequences such as withdrawal symptoms (Koob, 2013).
Some aversive consequences cannot be avoided by further drug
administration, however; the social isolation and damage to
health that often result from persistent addiction are examples of
the punishing outcomes of such behavior (Rachlin, 2000b; Foxall
and Sigurdsson, 2011).
The Need for a Cognitive Dimension
There are several reasons for thinking more formally about
the place and function of a cognitive dimension within
neurophysiologically based models of decision-making. The
principal reason in the current context stems from the fact
that the “valuation” involved in temporal discounting is a
mental construct which requires explanation in terms of
cognitive representation and evaluation. This, in turn, raises
the concern that the present dual process structure of the
model may be inadequate to the task of accounting for the
metacognitive processes involved in the exercise of self-control.
In the discussion that follows, the distinction between the sub-
personal level of exposition, that concerning brains and neuronal
activity, and the personal level of exposition, that which involves
intentionality (e.g., desires, beliefs, emotions, and perceptions)
and behavior (Dennett, 1969), is not only of primary importance
but inviolate (Foxall, 2007).
ANTIPODALITY
Bases of Antipodality
The CNDS model is an example of a dual process theory,
i.e., one that builds on a substantial volume of social scientific
argument that human cognition is characterized by two categorial
styles of processing (Frankish and Evans, 2009). Type 1
processing is autonomous: its execution is rapid and mandatory,
economizes on central processing capacity and higher-level
control systems, and employs parallel processing so that it avoids
interfering with other cognitive operations. These characteristics
illustrate the computational ease that makes Type 1 processing
the default processing mode: unless it its overridden, it will
automatically generate a category of responses to environmental
conditions. Type 1 processing includes the regulation of behavior
by the emotions, encapsulated modules that solve adaptive
problems, implicit learning processes and the automatic firing
of overlearned associations. By comparison with the Type 1
thinking that characterizes the autonomous mind (Stanovich,
2009), the second category of processing, type 2, is slow and
makes heavy computational demands. It requires attention,
which is costly, and is involved in conscious problem solving,
eventuating in behavior that is directed toward achieving long-
range consequences.
The distinction between the impulsive and the executive
systems, and that between their respective styles of processing,
suggests at least two categorial bases of evaluation and
judgment that have opposing tendencies toward behavioral
outcomes. This implies that at the systems can be construed as
antithetical in important respects that can be related to their
interaction to produce particular observed behavior patterns.
These antipodal tendencies of the impulsive and executive
systems ought ideally to indicate why behavioral imbalance
would result from the hyperactivity of one system simultaneously
with the hypoactivity of the other, a possibility which Bickel
et al. (2012b) have investigated. These authors propose eight
executive functions relevant to the CNDS model: Attention,
Inhibitory control, Valuing future events, Cognitive behavioral
flexibility, Working memory, Planning, Emotional activation
and self-regulation, and Metacognitive processes. The first
four are categorized as concerned with the cross-temporal
organization of behavior (CTOB). Emotional activation and
self-regulation (EASR), comprising two elements: Processing
of emotional information and Initiating and maintaining
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goal-related responding, and metacognition (MC) comprising
two more: Social cognition (consisting in theory of mind,
empathy) and Insight (or self-awareness). In addition, they
propose as elements in the impulsive system, two trait
impulsivities: Sensation seeking and Sensitivity to reward, and
four state impulsivities: Behavioral disinhibition, Attention
deficit impulsivity, Reflection impulsivity, and Impulsive choice
(preference for SSR over LLR). The impulsive and executive
systems, delineated in terms of the components identified by
Bickel et al. (2012b), are shown as interacting systems in Figure 2.
Bickel et al. (2012b) assess antipodality by reference to
four criteria: definition, measurement, overlapping of clinical
populations, and commonality of neural substrates of the
elements of impulsivity and executive function that comprise the
CNDS model. It emerges from their analysis that the four state
impulsivities are definitionally antipodal to four of the executive
functions. Attentional deficit impulsivity and attention are clearly
opposites, while the definitions of behavioral inhibition and
behavioral disinhibition contain common characteristics that set
them apart. In addition, reflection impulsivity tends toward the
opposite of planning. Finally, the selection of SSR over LLR
is antipodal to the capacity to value future outcomes. Note
that the four executive functions identified as having antipodal
impulsivities all belong to the CTOB grouping.
The analysis of antipodality also reveals a categorically
distinct though coterminous measures of impulsive system and
executive system items in the case of attention-deficit impulsivity
and attention, and for behavioral inhibition and behavioral
disinhibition. Reflective impulsivity and planning are less similar
in their measurement. Finally, the delay discounting methods
employed to measure impulsivity have recently come to be used
in the measurement of executive functions. Note once more that
these results establish CTOB as the seat of executive function
which is the antipode to impulsivity.
The third source of evidence is the overlap of clinical
populations whose members suffer from addiction and who show
either hypoactive executive function or hyperactive impulsivity.
Some substance users/abusers for instance demonstrate response
inhibition deficits and excesses in behavioral disinhinbition.
When the substance is alcohol, this tends to be accompanied
by lack of attention on the one hand and exaggerated attention
deficit impulsivity on the other. Deficits in planning and
high levels of reflection impulsivity are found in users of
amphetamines, cigarettes, and opiates. Finally, addicts to alcohol,
cigarettes, cocaine, and heroin display steeper discounting of
delayed reward more than controls do. Executive function deficits
are also closely related to drug addiction.
Finally, in terms of the overlap in neural substrates of brain
regions implicated variously in the functioning of the impulsive
and executive systems, it is noteworthy that the insula and parts
of the PFC are implicated in both behavioral disinhibition and
behavioral inhibition. Moreover, since choice impulsivity and
the valuation of future events are measured by means of delay
discounting assignments they must recruit the same brain areas;
they also cite the strongly emerging evidence that the limbic and
paralimbic areas are implicated in immediate choice whilst parts
of the PFC are implicated in the selection of delayed reward
(and therefore with the valuation of future events). Again, it
is noteworthy that all of these executive functions belong to
the CTOB category. There is, however, little evidence of any
overlap between the neural substrates of reflection impulsivity
and planning other than the observation that individuals with
lesions to the frontal cortices exhibit high reflection impulsivity
which supports the view that DLPF and DMPFC are concerned
with planning. There is also a paucity of evidence for any
neural overlap for attention and attention deficit impulsivity.
Nor is impulsivity antipodally related to working memory,
EASR or MC even though impediments to these are found
variously in addiction. Overall we may conclude that CTOB is
antipodally related to the state impulsivities by evidence that
they implicate similar neural substrates but that there is little
evidence that the other elements employed in the categorization
of executive functions shown in Figure 2 are similarly related to
impulsivity.
This does not constitute an original critique of the CNBDS
model; indeed, the points made are all acknowledged by Bickel
et al. (2012b). These authors specifically note that working
memory answers no antipodal aspect of impulsivity and they
draw attention to the lack of antipodal relationship between
EASR and MC on one hand and impulsivity on the other. Such
a relationship would be expected if EASR and MC belonged to
executive functions. However, this examination of the findings
suggests an alternative depiction of how the impulsive system and
executive system are related.
FIGURE 2 | Competing Neuro-behavioral Decision Systems (CNDS). This depiction shows the interaction of the impulsive and executive systems which are
delineated in terms of the components as identified by Bickel et al. (2012b).
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Locating Metacognition
Since the evidence for antipodality locates the competing
classes of activity of the impulsive and executive systems
firmly within neurophysiological bases, the task remains of
placing the decision-making or cognitive elements of CNDS,
currently located in the executive System (Figure 2), for which
no evidence of corresponding and antipodal functions within
the impulsive system has been adduced. There are in fact
good reasons for separating metacognition (MC) and emotional
activation and goal regulation (EASR), in which these cognitive or
decision-making functions inhere, from the neurophysiological
dimensions which are demonstrably antipodal. Because both MC
and EASR involve thought or feeling about thought or feeling,
I shall refer to them collectively as metacognition, though there
may not exclusively fulfill this role in explaining human behavior.
The justification for treating these cognitive variables as involved
in the explanation of behavior is as follows.
If the CNDS model were conceived solely in terms of the
neurophysiologically defined impulsive and executive systems
that have been shown to be antipodal, then the individual’s
behavior manifested in a degree of temporal discounting peculiar
to him/her would be the outcome of a sub-personal battle
between opposing biological forces. Behavior would be starkly
determined by innate neurophysiological capacities resulting
from phylogenetic evolution, modified by a learning history that
results in neural plasticity formed in a process of Hebbian or
similar learning (Rolls, 2008). Behavior would be no more than
contingency-shaped, determined in its totality by contingencies
of natural selection and operant conditioning. However, this
would be to ignore the rule-governance of behavior, the
possibility of an influence of reflective thought on responding.
By including MC and EASR in their model, Bickel et al. (2012b)
take this into account. Their inability to find or suggest functions
of the impulsive system that are antipodal to these cognitive
functions, which in any case repose uneasily among the other
elements of the executive system depicted in Figure 2, argues for
their separate consideration. The resulting re-conceptualization
is shown in Figure 3 in which MC and EASR are shown
separately from the executive system which contains only those
elements that are demonstrably antipodal to elements of the
impulsive system. The impulsive system retains pro tem the
trait impulsivities, sensation-seeking and reward sensitivity, that
have no demonstrable correspondents in the executive system.
Figure 3 indicates also the reliance of MC and EASR on working
memory.
The empirical outcome of the search for antipodality between
impulsive and executive systems represented by Bickel et al.’s
(2012b) research suggests the outcome shown in Figure 3.
But there is a theoretical imperative for the proposal that
metacognition occupy a superordinate position to the competing
impulsive and executive systems. If the conflict of these systems
is to be resolved by means of “cognition about cognition” or
“thinking about thinking,” it follows that such metacognitive
activity must take place in a forum separate from the categorial
systems themselves: how else could such activity decide between
the interests these systems underpin? As a judge always sits apart
from and acts independently of the advocates of plaintiff and
defense, the realm of mediation, intercession, and arbitration in
FIGURE 3 | Separation of Metacognition (MC) and Emotional Activation and Self-Regulation (EASR) from the Executive System. This depiction shows
the MC and EASR components separately from the executive system since they have no apparent antipodal correspondents in the impulsive system. This is
suggestive of their exerting a superordinate influence over the impulsive and executive systems and their interactions. It is therefore indicative of the necessity of
developing a tripartite model of the cognitive control of CNDS.
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decision-making cannot be incorporated within either the short-
range interest that tends toward immediate gratification or the
long-range interest that seeks a wider echelon of optimization.
A tri-PROCESS MODEL
Structure of the tri-Process Model
Recent theoretical development in multi-process theory suggest
that metacognitive processes such as MC and EASR are most
appropriately positioned as superordinate to the interactions
of impulsive and executive systems as well as other systems
that influence their interrelationship (Stanovich, 2009). Since no
antipodal relationship between MC and EASR on one hand and
components of the impulsive system on the other suggests that
this possibility at least be considered as a means of understanding
more fully the import of the CNDS model.
The similarity of the Type 1/Type 2 dichotomy to that of
the Impulsive system/Executive system distinction is readily
apparent. But any conclusions about the structure of the CNDS
model in terms of these different styles of processing should
take account of Stanovich’s proposal for a tri-process theory
(Figure 4). In proposing such a structure, Stanovich (2009)
extends his earlier model both conceptually by adding a level
of processing as well as by increasing the number of systems
that comprise each level of processing. So, instead of a single
Autonomous Mind, Stanovich (2009, p. 56) proposes “a set of
systems in the brain that operate autonomously in response to
their own triggering stimuli and are not under the control of the
analytic processing system [i.e., System 2]”. This heterogeneous
set, to which he refers as The Autonomous Set of Systems
(TASSs), contains systems that are related in terms of their style of
functioning (i.e., automaticity) rather than related by modularity.
The proposed tri-process CNDS model incorporates two systems
of Automatic Mind: the state-impulsive system comprising the
state impulsivities and the trait-impulsive system comprising
sensation-seeking and reward/reinforcement sensitivity (See also
Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Shea et al., 2014).
Type 2 processing is divisible into two sorts of operation,
each characteristic of a “kind of mind” (Dennett, 1996).
The Algorithmic Mind involves individual differences in fluid
intelligence, that which is measured by IQ tests, while the
Reflective Mind involves individual differences in rational
thinking dispositions. Rationality is broader than intelligence,
requiring well-formulated desires (goals), highly calibrated
beliefs and the ability to act on them in order to achieve the goals.
It is, therefore, closely associated with the elements that Bickel
et al. (2012b) position as components of the Executive system
which, in their analysis, found no corresponding antipodal
response in the Impulsive system.
The distinction between the two Type 2 systems posited by
the tri-process theory rests on several functional differences.
The key function of the Reflective Mind is the inauguration
of the call to begin cognitive simulation or hypothetical
reasoning. The key operation of the Algorithmic Mind
in this is the decoupling it carries out. Decoupling is
cognitively demanding, assisted by language which provides
“the discrete representational medium that greatly enables
hypotheticality to flourish as a culturally acquired mode of
thought” (Stanovich, 2009, p. 63). Hypothetical thought requires
FIGURE 4 | Essential relationships in Stanovich’s tripartite theory.
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the representation of assumptions for instance and linguistic
forms like conditionals readily allow this. Decoupling abilities
differ in their recursiveness and complexity. Decoupling makes
it possible to distance oneself from the representations so they
can be reflected on and improved. Decoupling is therefore
the key function of the algorithmic mind. It is clearly a
System 2 operation in that its operation occurs serially and
incurs high computational expense. The literature on executive
function and working memory, he argues, supports the view
that the main function of Algorithmic Mind is to achieve
decoupling among representations while conducting cognitive
simulation.
The cognitive control exerted by elements of the tri-processual
model is justified as follows. System 2, representing analytic mind,
contains two levels of functioning: the algorithmic level and the
reflective level. TASS systems will function on a short range basis
unless this is overridden by the Algorithmic System which give
precedence to the long range goals of the analytical system. These
latter reflect the goals of the person and the “epistemic thinking
dispositions”. But these goals and dispositions must arise at a
level superior to that of the Algorithmic System namely in the
Reflective System “a level containing control states that regulate
behavior at a high level of generality” (Stanovich, 2009, p. 57).
This distinction of analytical systems gives rise to a tripartite
system of cognitive processing. The Algorithmic Mind and the
Reflective Mind share properties (such as capacity-limited serial
processing) that distinguish them from the Automatic Mind
(Stanovich, 2009, p. 58) But Algorithmic Mind and Reflective
Mind can still be distinguished from one another, especially if
we think in terms in relation to the impulsive executive systems.
If these two systems of Automatic Mind are in conflict or
competition, as the CNDS model proposes them often to be,
any adjudication between them that results in a compromise
or balanced influence on behavior will have to be done at a
superordinate level of processing. It must draw on system goals
and strategic procedures that are not the property of either of
these systems but of a level of processing that is superior to both
of them. This is the Reflective Mind.
Stanovich (2009) argues that measures of the executive
functions actually draw upon elements of the Algorithmic Mind
rather than the Reflective Mind. While the term “executive”
seems superficially to suggest that these functions concern the
highest level of mind, Reflective Mind, the tasks used by cognitive
scientists to assess executive function actually test skills that
result from Algorithmic Mind. Research in cognitive psychology
in particular has been concerned with tasks that involve
algorithmic level decoupling abilities: stanovich mentions “stop
signal paradigms, working memory paradigms, time sharing
paradigms, inhibition paradigms” which are highly suggestive
of the components of executive function that Bickel et al.
(2012b) found to be antipodal to state impulsivities. Individual
differences in Reflective Mind capabilities are scarcely involved
in these tasks if at all. The Reflective Mind, especially with
respect to its involvement in epistemic regulation and cognitive
allocation is involved in cognitive control at a level beyond that
of the computational capacity to maintain decoupling. Stanovich
(2009, p. 66) argues, therefore, that the executive functions
have been misnamed: they are essentially supervisory processes,
he maintains, based on eternally provided rules rather than
internally inaugurated decision-making. By contrast, Reflective
Mind is involved in setting “the goal agenda” or in operating at
the level of epistemic regulation which he defines as “directing
the sequence of information pickup”. Executive functions are not
engaged in this kind of work.
While the executive system belongs to the Algorithmic Mind,
however, it does not constitute the Algorithmic Mind exclusively.
The executive system is fundamentally involved in the overriding
of the Automatic Mind but other functions of Algorithmic Mind
such as the execution of decoupling are not carried out by the
executive system. Similarly, the impulsive system is not the sole
element of TASS; the trait impulsivities (sensation seeking and
reinforcement sensitivity) also belong to TASS and are involved
in moderating the tendency toward impulsivity or self control at
the behavioral level. Hence, even the Type 1/Type 2 dichotomy
recognizes a complexity that goes beyond that of the original
CNDS model. However, Stanovich (2009, 2011; Stanovich et al.,
2012) argues for a further distinction, this time between the kinds
of processing for which Type 2 systems are severally responsible,
which if accepted complicates the division between impulsive and
executive systems made by the CNDS model. The interaction
of Type 1 and Type 2 processing is evinced by the capacity
of the second to prevent the automatic responses inherent in
Type 1 processing to engender impulsive behaviors that result
in suboptimal outcomes. “Better” responses depend on Type 2
hypothetical reasoning in which the individual builds models of
the world and performs cognitive simulations on them. Stanovich
et al. (2012, p. 787) comment, “When we reason hypothetically,
we create temporary models of the world and test out actions
(or alternate causes) in that simulated world,” words reminiscent
of Popper’s observation that “our conjectures, our theories, die
in our stead!” (Popper, 1977) In order to effect this cognitive
functioning, Type 2 processes can override those of Type 1,
interrupting and suppressing Type 1 functioning and then
substituting alternative responses. Moreover, in order to form
simulations, it is necessary to decouple simulated models from
the real world so that they can be manipulated independently.
This initiation of decoupling secondary representations from the
world and maintaining them while simulation occurs is a Type 2
operation.
Having “taken TASS oﬄine,” the Algorithmic Mind initiates
decoupling which enables cognitive simulation to take place.
The outcomes of this are reviewed by Reflective Mind which
initiates change in serial associative cognition which influences
Algorithmic Mind to develop a response. The initiation of
serial associative cognition illustrates that while all hypothetical
thinking involves analytical mind, not all the actions of analytic
mind involve hypothetical thinking. Serial associative cognition
is somewhat shallow thinking, “cognition that is not rapid and
parallel such as TASS processes, but is nonetheless inflexibly
locked into an associative mode that takes as its starting point
a model of the world that is given to the subject” (Stanovich,
2009, p. 68, 70). Serial associative cognition “is serial and analytic
. . . in style, but it relies on a single focal model that triggers
all subsequent thought.” Hypothetical thinking constitutes a
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vital reasoning function. The reflective and algorithmic processes
of the analytic mind each have a key function within this
process. Hypothetical thinking is closely related to the notion
of TASS override. The analytic system must take TASS-initiated
tendencies toward behavior oﬄine and replace them with a more
appropriate response. Such better responses come from cognitive
simulation where they can be tested; only if they survive that will
they be adopted.
Triple Processing in the Context of CNDS
It is feasible, therefore, to develop the CNDS model by
incorporating MC and EASR as components of a level of
processing superordinate to those of the impulsive and executive
systems (Figure 4). This figure depicts two Type 1 impulsive
or TASS systems: the first comprises the state impulsivities that
Bickel et al. (2012b) showed to be antipodal to components
of the Executive system; the second is composed of the two
trait impulsivities, sensation seeking and reward sensitivity,
that are not linked antipodally to elements of the Executive
system. They are shown here as exerting modifying influences
on the relationship between the State Impulsive System and the
Executive System. This key relationship is shown by the bold
arrow. The Executive System exerts Type 2 influence on this
relationship which is modified also by the action of the Type
2 Reflective System which promotes balance between the State
Impulsive System and the Executive System. The Type 2 systems
draw upon Working Memory, another element ascribed to the
Executive system in the original CNDS model (Figure 1) which
has no antipodal complement in the Impulsive system, for their
operations. For this reason, it is shown separately from the Type
1 and Type 2 systems in Figure 5. The relationship between the
State Impulsive System and the Executive System (bold arrow) is
the immediate precursor of the degree of temporal discounting
exhibited in the individual’s behavior.
Individual differences in sensation seeking and reward or
reinforcement sensitivity, which may derive from the individual’s
neurophysiology and/or learning history, are posited as
moderating the relationship between the impulsive and executive
systems. Sensation seeking is understood by Zuckerman (1979,
1994) as a preference for sensations and experiences that
embody variation, novelty, and complexity, together with a
willingness to incur physical and social risks in order to gain
such experience. Reinforcement sensitivity reflects individual
differences in susceptibility to reinforcing and aversive stimuli.
Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST; Corr, 2008; Smillie, 2008)
relates propensity to behavior not only to the stimuli that have
been consequential on such behavior in the past but also to the
mediating neurophysiological events that are the immediate
precursors of responding.
Left to itself, the Automatic Mind will act via the state
impulsivities, in the absence of any influence of the behavioral
inhibition, planning, and attention-maintaining tendencies of
the Algorithmic Mind: the result will be a failure to reflect
on the longer-range outcomes of immediate behavior, so that
the resulting behavior reflects a preference for SSR over LLR.
Pursuit of this short-range interest can be overcome only by
an intervention of the Reflective Mind which initiates override
of the Automatic Mind via the Algorithmic Mind. Acting in
response to the Reflective Mind’s initiation of override, the
Algorithmic Mind activates its executive functions that counter
impulsivity (paying attention, drawing on behavioral flexibility
and disinhibition, planning, and valuing future events) and
which enable longer-term interests to be explored and pursued.
Override, which thus consists in the countering of the immediate
short range of the Automatic Mind by exercise of the executive
functions, does not of itself result in the formulation of a plan for
longer-term behavior, however. Planning with foresight entails
that the Reflective Mind also initiate the decoupling of the
representations for which the Automatic Mind and Algorithmic
Mind are responsible so that simulation of alternative courses of
action can take place. Simulation makes possible the hypothetic
thinking that permits these alternatives to be generated and
tested: an apparently satisfactory plan (one that is strategically
and consistent with long-term goals and capabilities) engenders
a response from Reflective Mind such as the pursuit of a
longer-term objective in place of the impulsive action which
unencumbered Automatic Mind would have produced.
The trait impulsivities can promote or impede the operations
of either the Automatic Mind or the Reflective Mind, working
toward the generation of either the short- or long-range interest.
Trait impulsivities, sensation-seeking and reward sensitivity, are
based on individual differences which are susceptible to learning
history as well as the neurophysiological basis of behavior.
How the trait impulsivity system works is debatable but it
may be responsible for the style of thinking characteristic of
or preferred by an individual, his/her tendency toward an
analytical or intuitive approach to problem solving (Sadler-Smith,
2009). This would set limits to an individual’s range of actual
behaviors. Imagine a hypothetical range of behaviors from the
most impulsive to the most executively controlled which contains
all the actual ranges of behavior of which individuals in the
population are capable. The actual range of any individual will
be a subset of this. The extent of the actual subset that is the
behavioral range of any individual will reflect his/her cognitive
style especially as it is determined by sensation-seeking and
reinforcement sensitivity, the propensity of his/her behavior to
be reinforced by highly arousing stimuli and immediate reward.
The tri-process configuration captures well the requirements
of the CNDS model, especially in portraying those of its elements
that have been shown to be antipodal, those that remain after
the establishment of antipodality has been exhausted, and the
relationships among them. The tri-process model comprises
an Automatic Mind which responds rapidly to environmental
circumstances (which captures well the imperatives of the
impulsive system posited by the CNDS model). This Automatic
Mind can, however, be checked by the Algorithmic Mind (that
includes the executive system which has precisely the antithetical
imperatives required to counter the impulsive tendencies of
Automatic Mind). The Algorithmic Mind’s countering the
tendencies of the Automatic Mind relies in turn on its being
directed by the Reflective Mind to override the Automatic Mind
in order to inaugurated the decoupling of representations based
on reality so that the procedure of simulation via hypothetical
thought can occur. In simulation, alternative behaviors that
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FIGURE 5 | Metacognitive Control of CNDS. This model depicts two Type 1 impulsive systems which are responsible, respectively, for the state impulsivities that
are antipodal to the elements of the Executive System, and the trait impulsivities that modify the relationship between the State Impulsive System and the Executive
System. This key relationship is shown by the bold arrow. The Executive System exerts Type 2 influence on this relationship which is modified also by the action of
the Type 2 Rational System which encourages co-operation between the State Impulsive System and the Executive System. The Type 2 systems draw upon
Working Memory for their operations. The relationship between the State Impulsive System and the Executive System (bold arrow) is the immediate precursor of the
degree of temporal discounting exhibited in the individual’s behavior.
might be enacted can be examined in terms of their outcomes
in the short and long term. The information so gained is
fed back to the Reflective Mind which inaugurates action.
The Reflective Mind has additional functions which include
monitoring environmental circumstances and being aware of
the likely response of the Automatic Mind to them in order to
initiated decoupling and simulation. These are not the functions
of the Algorithmic Mind of the tri-process theory or the executive
system of the CNDS model.
A tri-Process Framework
The CNDS model portrays normal and addictive behaviors as
the outcomes of interaction between an impulsive system based
on limbic and paralimbic brain regions and an executive system
based in PFC. The interaction is indexed behaviorally by the
steepness of the temporal discounting an individual’s decision-
making exhibits. Several of the elements of the impulsive and
executive systems in the model are antipodal in terms of
their definition, measurement, application to populations of
addicts, and neurophysiological substrates. Specifically, the state
impulsivities of the impulsive system and the elements of the
executive system responsible for the CTOB display antipodality.
Configuring the remaining elements of the model according
to developments in multi-process theories of cognition does
not detract from the CNDS model but extends its capacity
to explain normal and addictive behaviors. It has, therefore,
been argued that elements of the impulsive and executive
systems that do not correspond in this way, constitute additional
systems that provide a more comprehensive understanding of
the ways in which the interaction of the competing systems
eventuate in behavioral responses. In the tri-systems theory of
Stanovich (2009), a third level of processing (Reflective Mind)
provides a mechanism through which the conflicting imperatives
toward impulsivity and restraint of more basic systems can
be managed and superseded. Metacognition (MC) and EASR,
elements of the CNDS model’s executive system which find no
antipodal correspondents in the impulsive system, contribute
to this third level. The state-impulsive system belongs to what
Stanovich terms Automatic Mind, while the executive system
belongs to Stanovich’s Algorithmic Mind. The trait impulsivities,
sensation-seeking and reward sensitivity, which have no antipodal
correspondents in the executive system form an additional
system within Automatic Mind. This trait-impulsivity system
moderates the individual’s behavioral output which manifests in
a rate of temporal discounting. This move receives support from
Stanovich and West’s (2003) argument that there are individual
differences in how effective Algorithmic Mind is in overriding
Automatic Mind. The removal of the trait impulsivities from
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the impulsive system to form another TASS makes these
variables’ influence more coherent; if they act negatively on the
relationship between the impulsive and executive systems, they
can undermine overriding, decoupling and perhaps simulation.
Ross et al. (2008) note that some individuals may simply be
incapable of bundling. One of the causes of this deficiency
may be the overvaluation of reinforcers that arises from a
tendency toward seeking unusually high levels of arousal and the
particularly strong sensitivity to reward.
A Proposal for Empirical Research
The composite model summarized in Figure 5 proposes that the
outcome of conflict between the State Impulsivity System and
the Executive System is the immediate precursor and cause of
the rate of temporal discounting exhibited in the individual’s
behavior. The model suggests further that the Reflective System is
responsible for the extent to which social insight and emotional
control exert an inhibiting influence on the tendency toward
impulsive behavior (choice of SSR over LLR); it suggests also
that the Trait Impulsivity System is responsible for the degree
to which the individual is inclined to control his/her impulsivity
and that sensation seeking and reinforcement sensitivity are
especially potent in this regard. The variables that compose
the Reflective System and the Trait Impulsivity System reflect
individual differences in self-control versus impulsivity. The
precise measures of the effects of the Reflective System and
Trait Impulsivity System remain to be empirically determined.
The task of empirical research inspired by the model is to
determine how and to what extent these variables impact the rate
at which temporal discounting occurs and therefore the degree
of balance the individual exhibits between the operation of the
State Impulsive System and the Executive system. The following
suggestion for empirical research is indicative in general terms
of the feasibility of a research program that would facilitate
the critical examination of hypotheses drawn from the model.
Its principal objective at this stage is to demonstrate that the
model is amenable to empirical investigation and is falsifiable in
principle.
Stanovich argues that Reflective Mind involves the exercise
of a cognitive style that influences the overarching approach
an individual assumes in the pursuit of problem solving and
decision making. As I have discussed elsewhere (Foxall, 2014b,
2016), one approach to the empirical delineation of cognitive
style is provided by Kirton’s (2003) adaption-innovation theory
and measure. On this theory, extreme adaptors pursue solutions
to problems within tried and tested frameworks of experience-
based analysis and conceptualization and are likely to discount
the future less steeply than innovators who seek solutions in
novel and outlandish proposals which entail steeper discounting.
The adaptor is likely therefore to exhibit greater capacities for
social cognition and insight, to process emotional information
in a more constrained fashion, and to persist in the pursuit of a
goal once it has been adopted. The innovator is more likely to rely
more on his/her own notions of how pursuit of a specific behavior
would generate effective consequences, to be more emotionally
involved in the advocacy of his/her ideas, and to be more easily
deflected from current goals in favor of novel objectives. The
behavior patterns typical of adaptors and innovators may also
be grounded in separate neurophysiological regions (van der
Molen, 1994). There is therefore scope for empirical research
which seeks to test the hypotheses (1) that adaptors exhibit a
lower rate of temporal discounting on specified decision tasks
than will innovators, and (2) that these cognitive styles are
associated with the innervation of distinct neurophysiological
regions that reflect the brain bases of high and low levels of
temporal discounting.
Similar investigation is feasible by means of psychometric
measures of sensation seeking and reinforcement sensitivity
which may be employed to monitor the trait impulsivity of
individuals engaged on tasks involving decisions that reflect
differing rates of temporal discounting. Higher levels of both
of these traits would be expected to associate with steeper
temporal discounting and also to be linked to distinct brain
regions. To the extent that sensation seeking and reinforcement
sensitivity are captured by the adaption-innovation spectrum,
Kirton’s measure of cognitive style may also suffice for the
investigation of these dimensions of trait impulsivity. The
ultimate aim of research of this kind is to establish double
dissociations (a) between components of cognitive functioning
and rate of temporal discounting, and (b) between cognitive
functions and neurophysiological activation. Initial investigation
(Foxall and Yani-de-Soriano, 2011) suggests that the thorough
empirical examination of the model would require psychometric
investigation of the individual traits that comprise the Reflective
System and the Trait Impulsive System in order to present a more
fine-grained analysis of the relationships proposed by the model.
Situational variables, notably the specific nature of the decision
under investigation would likely influence the extent to which
consumers discount the future in addition to the contribution of
their fundamental cognitive styles.
DISCUSSION
Bundling in tri-Processual Perspective
Of the three components of the CNDS model – neurophysiology,
decision-making (cognition), and behavior – cognition probably
has received least attention. The foregoing discussion supports
the conclusion, however, that if the elements of the CNDS model
are configured in accordance with multi-process theories of
cognitive control such as that of Stanovich (2009) the cognitive
implications of the model can be made explicit. This proposition
can be tested by applying the framework presented in Figure 5 to
explicate the idea of bundling.
Bundling involves an individual’s adoption of a rule in order
to overcome the tendency to select the inferior of two rewards
as a result of discounting the future hyperbolically. The rule
prescribes that one consider all of one’s choices between pairs of
reward of this kind in a way that makes one’s present choice the
precedent for later choices. In this way the individual precommits
him/herself to act in a particular manner by recognizing that
selecting an entire series of LL alternatives motivates him/her
to avoid temporary preferences for SS options when they arise
(Ainslie, 1992, 2001, 2007; Ainslie and Monterosso, 2003).
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An individual who considers each choice between an SSR and
a LLR as it arises is likely as we have seen to initially prefer the
latter but to switch preferences when the value of the former is
magnified by the fact of its imminent availability. This pattern
is recursive: good resolution is followed by akrasia, not once but
repeatedly. If this person resolves to consider the sum of all future
SSRs in relation to the sum of all future LLRs, the conclusion is
that future LLRs will cumulatively outstrip future SSRs. Crucially,
the sum of the series of LLRs is also greater than the first SSR
that will be encountered in the series, i.e., when it becomes
immediately available, a comparison which makes acceptance of
the LLR on this first occasion easier. Insofar as this first choice
is predictive of later choices, following this rule makes a series
of LLR choices more probable. The bundling strategy is not only
theoretically defensible but also practically efficacious (Ross et al.,
2008).
Both the Automatic Mind (embodying the impulsive system)
and the Algorithmic Mind (executive system) are involved
in this process. However, bundling requires in addition an
array of mental operations which can be most appropriately
understood by reference to the tri-process model we have
considered. These operations include (i) holding the immediately
available behavioral option in mind, (ii) holding the array of
long range behaviors and their outcomes in mind, (iii) summing
the outcomes of the long range behaviors, (iv) bringing the
summed outcomes into comparison with that of the short range
outcome, and (v) adjudicating between them. These operations
cannot be carried out within either the impulsive system or the
executive system. Neither has the capacity to undertake these
tasks. Moreover, since the short-term and long-term interests
depicted in terms of temporal discounting by picoeconomics,
exist by definition at different times, the only way in which they
can be brought together is mentally, specifically through the
medium of imaginative or hypothetical thinking. Representations
of the two interests must be created and allowed to impinge on
one another. Hence, the process of bundling is that described
by Stanovich as requiring the decoupling of the Automatic
Mind and the simulation by means of hypothetical thinking
of alternative scenarios for future behavior. These operations
require the monitoring of the behavioral tendencies of Automatic
Mind in light of environmental contingencies (which must
also be monitored beyond the level of the impulsive system),
the initiation of override of the Automatic Mind, and the
initiation of simulation via decoupling in which alternatives to
the immediate uncritical pursuit of short-term gratification are
hypothesized and evaluated. The only area of mind that can
initiate these procedures is the Reflective Mind. The Algorithmic
Mind cannot undertake such monitoring and initiating. Its
functions are regulatory and supervisory rather than innovative,
and bundling depends on hypothetical thinking that brings a
multiplicity of long range outcomes and short range outcomes
into the same arena and allows them to impinge on one
another so that a calculation based on the valuation of the
separate outcomes and a selection the appropriate action can be
made.
There is another reason why the tri-process model is
particularly relevant to the analysis of normal and addictive
decision-making by means of the CNDS model and
picoeconomics. Neither the state-impulsive system element
of the Automatic Mind nor the executive system of the
Algorithmic Mind can adjudicate between the imperatives
of immediate gratification that fulfill the short-range interest
embodied in the former and the delayed benefits that fulfill
those of the long-range interest. Both the CNDS model and
picoeconomics are enhanced by the inclusion of Reflective
Mind in the overall system of decision-making they posit.
The Reflective Mind is a kind of present self that can
hypothesize about the behaviors of one’s past self and future
self. Hypothetical reasoning requires that representations
of the real world not interfere with representations of
imaginary situations. In comparing the pleasure to be
obtained by ingesting a recently acquired drug with the
deleterious consequences of a series of binges in the future,
it is necessary to differentiate clearly the monetary cost of
the newly obtained supply of the drug from the imagined
emotional and social as well as financial costs of sustained
consumption that would be the outcome of binging. These
abstract operations require the participation of a Reflective
Mind.
Multiple Selves or Incompatible
Interests?
This account of bundling operations implies that the
rational decision-making element of the model shown in
Figure 5 is Reflective Mind. the impulsive and executive
systems (inherent in Automatic Mind and Algorithmic
Mind, respectively) appear to be largely neurophysiological
systems that are under the ultimate control of Reflective
Mind. It is here that personhood or agency is located: while
it may experience the conflict of having to decide between
alternative interests by determining the content of the utility
function that will be the outcome of its behavior, it is a single
person.
Dual process models such as CNDS contain the conflict
between short- and long-range interests within warring
impulsive and executive systems; picoeconomics, whilst open
to multiple selves, also tends in practice largely to confine
its deliberations to these two categories of mental operation.
But there are elements of the executive system, as defined in
Figure 2, that tri-process theories such as that of Stanovich
(2009) suggest play an overarching role in the relationships
between the systems it characterizes as Automatic Mind
and Algorithmic Mind and which, respectively, embrace
the impulsive and executive systems. The restructuring of
the model components, achieved in Figure 3, proposes that
MC and EASR would constitute part of this higher level
system, the Reflective Mind, which would be involved in the
regulation of the Automatic Mind which otherwise would
respond to environmental stimuli spontaneously or impulsively.
The regulation imposed by Reflective Mind would take
the form of its “innervating” Algorithmic Mind to initiate
the overriding of Automatic Mind and the decoupling of
mundane mental representations so that the simulation of
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hypothetical futures can be accomplished. Reflective Mind is
also portrayed in Stanovich’s theory as receiving the outputs
of simulation and effecting a response at the level of the entire
organism.
Caution is essential on the part of psychologists, whether
cognitive or behavior analytical, in their treatment of models
of this kind. Models that depict cognitive operations necessarily
deal in unobservables and there is a danger that these will
be multiplied without a firm empirical basis being provided
for them. In applied areas such as the treatment of addiction
and other forms of excessive consumption it may be necessary,
however, to use ascriptions of thought processes to individuals
in order to understand fully their behavior possibly as a prelude
to predicting and/or modifying it. There is, moreover, little
in the modeling which has been the subject of this paper
that could not be captured, though perhaps less economically,
in the language of behavior analysis and in particular that
of verbal behavior and rule-governance. There need be no
internecine conflict between adherents of different vocabularies
as long as the analysis is comprehensible to all in terms of
their several theoretical viewpoints. This is especially the case
if the new analysis proves useful at the level of effecting the
prediction and control of behavior but it is also justified if
its principal contribution is the furtherance of understanding
of the processes involved in shaping and maintaining that
behavior.
Where does this model-building lead in terms of resolving
the question of multiple selfhood that opened this paper? Ross
(2009; see also Ross, 2005) argues that there are present at t1
and t2, respectively, different agents as is demonstrated by there
being different utility functions at each time. However, useful this
agential distinction process is as an analytical device, the degree
of difference between selves or persons must not be exaggerated.
To argue that different persons or selves exist at t1 and t2 may be
self-defeating since it is only by establishing a considerable degree
of continuity between the person who exists at t1 and the person
who exists at t2 that we can comprehend why intrapersonal
conflict arises. If the t1 and t2 persons or selves are remote
from one another we can argue that neither is bound by what
the other has done (Hanson, 2009). If the selves can establish
this degree of moral separateness, it is difficult to see how
the motivational conflict engendered by the contemporaneous
existence of competing interests necessary for picoeconomics can
come about.
What exists at t1 and t2 is the organism; without the
assumption of at least this degree of continuity there would be
no conflict. The question is whether this self that persists is
the agent or whether “interests” or “selves” existing within the
person can be thought of as agents each of which has a separate
utility function. I would argue that the person who exists at t1
and t2 has different interests or motivations on each occasion
because he/she is facing different contingencies of reinforcement
and punishment. It is unnecessarily metaphysical to argue that
two persons or agents are involved: it is one person or agent
with conflicting interests. The interests have neurophysiological
correlates within the person which form a central aspect of
the impulsive and executive systems; these neurophysiological
events are to be understood at the sub-personal level of
exposition. The cognitive dimensions of the Automatic Mind
and Algorithmic Mind which include these and other systems
are to be understood, however, at the personal level of beliefs,
desires, perceptions, and emotions. Not only, contra Dennett
(1969, 1987), can the intentionality that properly belongs at the
personal level not be ascribed to sub-personal entities (Foxall,
2007); it is also not possible for the interests to have utility
functions of their own and thus be considered agential. Rather,
a person’s interests determine his/her preference structure (as
revealed in his/her choice behavior) which eventuates in his/her
utility function (the final configuration of the consequences
of his/her behavior (Rachlin, 1994, 1989). What changes from
t1 to t2 is the contingencies of reinforcement with which the
individual is faced; these have the effect of modifying his/her
utility function. The preferences embodied in his/her behavior
reflect the dominance of either the impulsive and executive
system (or the Automatic Mind and Algorithmic Mind of
which they are subsets) at that time. The Reflective Mind is
the personal forum within which the deliberations regarding
the alternative behaviors available and their likely outcomes
takes place. It is within the person that conflict occurs and is
felt.
The rational individual for whom akrasia is a commonplace
experience is not, therefore, two persons, or agents in the course
a day, but a single person who encounters differing situations
and changes his preferences accordingly; these preferences are
revealed in the earlier verbal behavior which values highly
constructive work and in the subsequent physical behavior which
values recreation. These contingencies of reinforcement are each
advantageous in their way at different times and insofar as
he/she is conscious of them they signal the benefits that will
derive from his/her behavior. These benefits form my interests.
There is no need to translate these extrapersonal interests
into intrapersonal homunculi that compete. What compete
are (i) the differing contingencies of reinforcement (at the
super-personal level), and (b) the differing neurophysiological
tendencies (at the sub-personal level). The personal level is
concerned with acting upon one or other of these, and/or
adjudicating between them. In the course of debating different
courses of action, any rational person may experience cognitive
discomfort, feel as though they are being wrenched first by
one alternative then the other as they participate in “making
a choice.” But at no time is this individual anything other
than a person facing incompatible options who finds this
situation aversive. He/she has only one utility function at a
time, by virtue of being able to perform only one behavior
at a time and his/her utility function is the outcome of that
behavior.
CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the CNDS model’s obvious strengths
can be enhanced through consideration of the categorial
structure of the model and the functions of its components.
Hence, the formulation shown in Figure 5 seems more closely
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aligned with the results of the investigation of the antipodality
of the impulsive and executive systems undertaken by Bickel
et al. (2012b). The question that arises from that exercise is
where the components of the impulsive and executive systems
(Figure 2) that have no antipodal correspondents should be
positioned within the CNDS model. The proposal to remove
MC and EASR from the Executive System and accord it a
superordinate role in cognitive control of (a) the impulsive
and executive systems and (b) overt behavior suggested in
Figure 3 is borne out by the theoretical reasoning advanced
by multi-process modelers such as Stanovich (2009). Recent
theoretical development suggests also that several systems
comprise Automatic Mind (Stanovich, 2011) and this offers a
role to the state impulsivities that do not exhibit antipodality
with any of the elements of the Executive System depicted
in Figure 2. A final tri-process model which incorporates the
restructured components of the CNDS hypothesis is put forward
in Figure 5. Although this model does not essentially contain
any components not already present in the original CNDS
model (Figure 2), it aims to present their interrelationships in
a way that is consistent with their functions in controlling the
imperatives of impulsivity and self-control and the individual’s
behavior.
Three themes emerge from this analysis. The first is the
implications for the CNDS model of considering cognitive
control of behavior in light of the tri-process theory. The second
is the capacity of the tri-process depiction of neuro-behavioral
decision-making to enhance understanding of addictive behavior
and its resolution. This is discussed by Foxall (2016) in terms
of the mental operations that are presupposed by picoeconomic
bundling and their incorporation in the model presented in
Figure 5, as is the nature of the multiple agents apparently
involved in the breakdown of will and its resolution is discussed
in the context of the model.
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